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BOOK REVIEW

A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE. Edited by
David Kairys. New York, Pantheon Books 1982. Pp. ix + 321.
Paperback. $9.95.
THE POLITICS OF LAW:

Reviewed by John Holly III*
A reader who is in the mood for light, uncontroversial
material should not sit down with The Politics of Law,1 a collection of thought-provoking essays on the American legal system. The genesis of the book is the Theoretical Studies Committee of the National Lawyer's Guild. The perspective is
leftist, often Marxist; the tone often combative. The essential
message is that capitalism has gutted the ideals of the American law by converting all aspects of human life into dollars
and cents, and by exalting individualism over social justice.
One hopes that more than a few practitioners will read
this book. In the context of legal practice, every attorney
makes choices about goals and tactics. Such choices are
grounded in the attorney's own values. These essays can provide needed perspective on commonly held values by challenging basic assumptions and by exposing some of the consequences of legal choices. For any attorney whose practice
expresses his or her values, this book will provide a stimulating, rewarding experience.
The book also offers superb material for the classroom.
One example is Duncan Kennedy's "Legal Education As A
Training For Hierarchy,"' a denunciation of white, male predominance in law school. According to Kennedy, law students
are shown that passivity and deference are virtues, and that
emotional content in learning is not suited to the rational
analysis of law. Professors and employers model this hierarchy
o 1983 by John Holly Ill.
* Partner, Beraldo & Holly, Santa Clara, California. B.A. Holy Cross College,
1973; M.A., Montclair State College, 1977; J.D., University of Santa Clara, 1981.
1. THE POLITICS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
2. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 40.
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of values for students who will, in later years, relate similarly
as senior partners and judges.'
Kennedy points out that a major function of law school is
to provide unskilled labor for the organized bar. Students are
ranked into a hierarchy without regard to the goal of competent legal practice. Since they are not equipped for many varieties of law practice, students are expected to scramble to find
places within a hierarchy of conventional law firms in order to
obtain necessary training.4 The value of exposing students to
Kennedy's ideas is that he asks important questions about
personal values. This inquiry could help stave off boredom
and cynicism, and some law professors might actually enjoy
teaching more if fewer students were bored and cynical.
The purpose of this book is to connect the legal system to
the wider political-economic context of American life. The
values of the legal system permeate every social institution.
Such basic concepts as "person," "property," and "government" are defined through the law. Implicit in these definitions is the ideology of American life; the authors assume that
the values of the dominant class adopt only enough change to
placate subordinate classes. As editor Kairys notes, "[tihe law
is a major vehicle for the maintenance of existing social and
power relations by the consent or acquiescence of the lower
and middle classes."
The methods used by American law to legitimate the status quo have evolved over time, and are chronicled by Elizabeth Mensch in her essay, "History of Mainstream Legal
Thought."6 Beginning from the foundation of the natural law,
Mensch observes that legal thinkers coined the concept of
utility in order to accommodate the industrial revolution.
Then, in the late nineteenth century, judges created an analysis "premised on private rights and strictly limited public
powers,"' 7 which helped to restrain populist and progressive
reforms.
Mensch goes on to note that this objective analysis was
attacked after World War I by those known as legal realists.
3. Id. at 59.
4. Id. at 52.
5. Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITCS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 18.
7. Id. at 24.
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The realists pointed out that every private right upheld by a
court is a grant of public power. The emphasis, according to
the realists, should be the social and historical context of the
law. Contemporary judges are heirs to this tradition of accommodation followed by rigidity and formalism. The modern solution is to concentrate on the "process" by which rights and
duties are defined. The goal is to make the process live up to
the reasonable expectations of the parties."
Mensch has written an extremely good but unsympathetic history. She sees the major function of American law as
a bludgeon to be used by the powerful against the powerless.9
Unfortunately, she does not resolve the tension between stability and the reality of change, so her criticism runs shallow.
Seeming not to appreciate the human dimension of the law,
perhaps Mensch fears that such appreciation would lead to an
apology for what she can only see as exploitation and
oppression.
In contrast to Mensch, Victor Rabinowitz in his essay,
"The Radical Tradition In The Law," 10 accepts that humans
are far from perfect and that legal systems are human creations. Unlike Mensch, he explicitly states his basic assumptions, so the reader can always understand his perspective. A
final contrast with Mensch is that Rabinowitz is an optimist.
He sees the law as a positive force which can inspire a vision
of social justice and can lead to an improvement in people's
lives.1"
One of Rabinowitz's basic assumptions is that "[n]o society of even moderate complexity, whether it be feudal, capitalist or socialist, can exist without law."1 2 Further,"[a]ll systems of law are constructed to protect the state and its
economic base."'13 Law, therefore, is necessary, and necessarily
related to the economic system. But the law can develop independently of economics because people yearn for "a better,
more rational, and more bearable existence ....
"" This
8. Id. at 26-29.
9. Id. at 20.
10. Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in
supra note 1, at 310.
11. Id. at 317-18.
12. Id. at 312.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 317.
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yearning pressures the state to limit its own power in the interest of stability. With the state limiting its powers, progress
can be made toward legal equality and fairness.
Lawyers can be part of this progress according to Rabinowitz. But the law, and lawyers, cannot be the only answers.
Achieving the goals of a socialist state has never been an object of American law. Such changes can only "be brought
about by extra-legal means." 15 So Rabinowitz adopts a moderate approach to the role of the radical lawyer. He does not
expect miracles, but he affirms that positive change has occurred. And, best of all, he proposes a course of action for
lawyers:
We can do our best to keep radical activists out of jail
and on the streets. We can seek to extend to their ultimate limits the rights of free speech, due process, freedom from unreasonable searches ... to make more possible changes in our economic system. We can expose police
abuse and protect the right of privacy, both in political
and personal affairs. . . . We can . . . join . . . in the
struggle for the establishment of democracy in the trade
unions.160
The fact that Rabinowitz, unlike Mensch, offers a plan of
action can be attributed to his acceptance of human imperfection and his optimism toward future change. Rabinowitz appears to have found a way to be an idealist in touch with reality. As such, he provides an approach to the rest of the book.
"A realistic . . . approach to the law . . . must acknowledge the fundamental conflicts in society," such as class, race,
and sex. 17 The relative impact of these conflicts can be seen in
the better essays in the collection. These essays organize disparate facts into a coherent picture, offer plausible explanations of current events, and point the way toward progressive
change.
For example, the legal system has attempted to resolve
the antagonism between the sexes in varying ways throughout
American history. One constant factor has been the oppression of women which "has changed historically in a dialectical
relationship to changes in economic and social development
15. Id. at 315.
16. Id. at 317-18.
17.

Kairys, supra note 5, at 6.
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and . . .the role of the family."' 8

The current state of the law, say Nadine Taub and Elizabeth Schneider, 19 relies on the fact that only women can become pregnant to justify differential legal treatment. Two Supreme Court cases, Geduldig v. Aieo11 20 and Michael M. v.
Superior Court,21 are used to illustrate this point. In

Geduldig, the Court upheld the exclusion of pregnancy from
coverage by worker's temporary disability insurance. In
Michael M., the Court upheld the exclusion of women from
punishment under statutory rape laws.
Taub and Schneider observe that workers are often denied full employment benefits. Because of pregnancy, it appears that young women can be held to a lesser standard of
responsibility than young men. It is important to see that
these two ideas reinforce one another. Denying women equal
employment benefits appears to be justified because they do
not have to bear equal burdens of responsibility. 22 Exploitation is justified in the law by the results of exploitation.
This same type of legal analysis is applied to race relations in two well-written essays by W. Hayward Burns 23 and
Alan Freeman.2 Both observe that, although Brown v. Board
of Education25 removed legal support for the white supremist
doctrine of "separate but equal" from governmentally sanctioned classifications, an equally pernicious myth which
promises "equality of opportunity" holds sway among our
largely non-white underclass today. This new myth allows
some modern Americans to be born into advantage without a
corresponding personal sense of social obligation, while other
citizens born into disadvantage internalize a personal sense of
failure.2 a The Burger Court, says Freeman, allows a remedy
18. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy,in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 296 (footnote omitted).
19. Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination, in THE POLrrICS OF LAW, supra note at 117.
20. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
21. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
22. See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)(male only draft registration does not violate equal protection).
23. Burns, Law and Race in America, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at

89.
24. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 96.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. "Blacks posted gains in home ownership, education, and voter registration
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for racism only when an intentional perpetration of racism
can be identified. This approach allows all those not labeled
as perpetrators to successfully avoid liability and to disassoci27
ate themselves from racial problems.
Another major theme of The Politics of Law is that the
law promotes capitalist values. Victor Rabinowitz's assumption that law protects the economic base of society is explored
in essays which examine the interaction of capitalism with
American law.2 8 The core values of capitalism, according to
economist Robert Heilbroner, incorporate a basically uncontrolled market system and rest on the private ownership of
the means of production. These values protect the class which
currently owns society's productive assets. "Certainly capitalism aims at the material well-being of its constituents, but
equally certainly it entertains no thought that the pursuit of
well-being will alter the basic class character of the system
... ," Several essays provide significant insight into the interaction between law and capitalism.
In "Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law"80 the author, Karl Klare, says that the law has improved to the point
of codifying procedural equality between the labor force and
those who represent capital. But the law also supports substantive inequalities which reflect social inequities. Procedural
equality, states Klare, is found in the reciprocal promises by
which labor promises not to strike and capital agrees to submit to arbitration of grievances. The substantive inequality is
that the union's promise not to strike is absolute, but capital
owners can exempt certain issues from arbitration. By examining those issues which are kept from arbitration, Klare
reveals the underlying values of labor law.
For instance, Klare postulates that capital owners regard
the labor business exclusively as the sale of labor as a commodity, like rubber, steel, or cement. A complementary postuin the 1970's, but black unemployment soared 140 percent and poverty continued
[steady at 34 percent]." Census Bureau, America's Black Population: 1970 to 1982,
San Jose News, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4A, col. 2.
27. Freeman, supra note 24, at 98-99.
28. Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 312.
29. R. HEILBRONER, Reflections on the Future of Socialism, in BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM, 79, 81 (1970).
30. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE PoLmcs oF LAW,
supra note 1, at 65.
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lation is that workers make no recognizable investment in a
company. A second primary concern of the existing capital
forces is that the unrestricted freedom of capital owners to
invest must be protected and enhanced. A third concern of
the existing capitalists identified by Klare is that the workplace must embody a social hierarchy, with capital at the top
81
and labor at the bottom.
These values ignore the fact that labor is provided by
thinking, feeling, human beings. People build homes, schools,
churches, and playgrounds to form a community near their
workplaces. This is truly an investment of financial and emotional resources. The fact that a community could be destoyed
by a plant shut-down or a pollution spill supports the conclusion that the interests of workers run more deeply than is
presently recognized by our existing body of labor law. The
fact that worker's taxes contribute to bail out a company like
Chrysler and to buy a nationally owned space shuttle from
Lockheed shows that workers, too, have a political stake in
corporate decisions. Author Klare proposes to expand the
scope of labor's involvement in the decision-making process to
include new notions about the content and purpose of work
and to revamp the allocation of social resources.3 2 For Klare,
labor law is one arena in which the evolution to greater
human freedom should take place by reordering the existing
hierarchy.
To continue the iconoclastic tenor of The Politics of Law,
an extremely cogent analysis of capitalism, crime, and police
conduct is presented by Mark Kelman in his essay "The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence." 88 Kelman reviews and
compares both the traditional mainstream and traditional
radical views of the origins of crime. Traditional criminologists ignore the fact that poverty and exploitation are factors
of crime in America. Radical criminology cannot account for
the rising rates of amoral, nihilistic violence. Finding both
theories wanting, Kelman develops his own theory.
The central idea in Kelman's theory is that crime and
criminals are outputs of society, similar to cars, soybeans, and
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 81.
33. Kelman, The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra note 1, at 214.

34. Id. at 220, 224.
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engineers. Our economic and social systems produce and distribute crime by the same mechanisms with which they produce and distribute these other products. It seems that
America has decided that it is more efficient to bear the costs
of crime (in terms of victims, jails, judges, police, and the like)
than it would be to create opportunities for unskilled, uneducated people.8 America has come to this point, writes Kelman, as a result of value choices which measure all aspects of
human life in dollars and cents.86
The materialistic aspect of American law is further severely criticized by Richard Abel in his essay, "Torts. '" Tort
law has evolved, argues Abel, because money has become
equated with "labor, possessions, care, emotional and physical
integrity, and ultimately love." 88 The ideal of individualism
has become warped to the point that, as a tort plaintiff, a person is worth what he or she owns.89 Awards for injury and
death actually add value to the gross national product. Social
class, gender, and race have become factors in deciding who
will be most at risk from accidents, while personal injury suits
have become lottery tickets with the winners envied by the
losers and the lawyers skimming money "off the top." By
means of those absurdities, says Abel, the law reinforces bourgeois ideology. 0
Abel's proposal for a way out of this abyss is to democratize the risk of accidents, instead of merely spreading the
costs. Those most at risk should have the greatest voice in
matters of health and safety. Instead of gambling on compensation for pain and suffering, Abel would limit awards to recoveries for property damage and lost earnings. This, he says,
would free up resources to promote equality of compensation,
comprehensive medical care, and adequate income guarantees.
His proposals would stimulate a more egalitarian society and
remove human care and love from the commodities market."1
35. See Rudovsky, The Criminal Justice System and the Role of the Police, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 242 (only Russia and South Africa imprison a

higher percentage of their population than America).
36. Kelman, supra note 33, at 225-26.
37. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1,
at 185.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 190.
40. Id. at 194.
41. Id. at 198-99.
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Attacking some of our core beliefs about the Constitution
and the first amendment, Mark Tushnet, in "Corporations
and Free Speech,

' 42

observes that speech, like all aspects of

human life in America, is a commodity which has found a
place in the market. 4 When speech is regulated only by supply and demand it becomes merely "another one of the assets
held by the powerful," instead of "a vehicle by which otherwise powerless people can gain power."

A classic example of

wealth buying power through political speech is the case of
Buckley v. Valeo," in which the Supreme Court invalidated
limits placed on political campaign contributions because
"there [is] no overriding interest in 'restrict[ing] the speech of
some . . . in order to enhance the relative voice of others
... , ,,4This case could be used to illustrate the aphorism

that money talks and a lot of money talks loudly.
David Kairys, like Tushnet, thinks that effective communication is expensive. 47 But this fact is obscured by an aura of
sacredness which cloaks the first amendment. Effective communication, writes Kairys, is never "free." It costs not only
money, but lives as well.' 8 Popular progressive movements
have always paid a price for expressing opposition to the status quo. Much of his essay, "Freedom of Speech," chronicles
the repression of dissent in America, from the Alien and Sedition Acts, through the abolition movement, to the bloody
struggles of the Wobblies and the developing labor unions.
Usually, says Kairys, broadening and strengthening the protections of the first amendment has followed basic shifts in
power and social relations. 9
Kairys points out that judicial opinion is deceptive because it ignores the political nature of the first amendment.
Judges and scholars have viewed the first amendment as a
facet of American jurisprudence instead of as a creature of social and economic forces.50 Instead of a dramatic progress to42. Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 1, at 253.
43. Id. at 256-57.
44. Id. at 257.
45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
46. Tushnet, supra note 42, at 259 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, at 48-49).
47. Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLmCS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 140.
48. Id. at 166.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id. at 161.
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ward liberty and equality, the legal system has created the image of polite discourse among refined people. Instead of being
regarded as a lever, a tool for changing society, free speech has
become a museum piece, to be admired but not utilized.
Kairys continues his expos6 of judicial deception in his
essay on "Legal Reasoning."' When judges claim to apply a
"neutral, objective application of legal expertise" instead of
acknowledging the personal, social, and political values which
are at work, judges commit the "central deception of traditional jurisprudence."5 2 The judiciary stands on precedent,
knowing full well that the "various relevant precedents will
provide some support for both sides rather than lead to a particular rule."5 Courts have only abandoned stare decisis when
"the legitimacy and power of the courts stood to be enhanced
by openly rejecting continuity in favor of politically popular
change." 54 Although he does not state so explicitly, Kairys
seems to think that the harm is not in the political nature of
the judiciary, but in the facade of objectivity used to hide this
political nature.
To conclude, the foregoing highlights some of the most
worthwhile material in this unusual collection. Rand Rosenblatt's common-sense socialistic explanation of the holding in
Dandridge v. Williams,5 5 Peter Gabel and Jay Feinman's idea
that modern contract law embodies an ironic contradiction in
American ideals,5 6 and Robert Gordon's thought that "[law,
like religion and television images, is one of these clusters of
belief. . . that convince people that all the many hierarchical
relations in which they live and work are natural and necessary," 7 all make for provocative reading, too.
Obviously, this controversial collection of essays is ambitious in scope. Tracing the history of American law provides a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Benefits,

Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
397 U.S. 471 (1970) cited in Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare
in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 270 (the limiting of monthly

grants to welfare families results in denying benefits to children rather than in encouraging adults in the work force).

56. Gabel and Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 179-80 (the American ideal of free trade and Horatio Alger does not
apply to the modern law of contracts, where stability and predictability are essential).
57. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 287.
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needed perspective for current problems. But too few of the
authors state in print what can be glimpsed between their
lines: they believe in the perfectability of society and they are
committed to a more just, humane world. Perhaps they take
these beliefs for granted in themselves, but more explicit
statements of this type might have provided a more coherent
overview to the work as a whole.
At its best, as in the essays by Victor Rabinowitz, Karl
Klare, Nadine Taub and Elizabeth Schneider, The Politics of
Law illuminates the pivotal role of the American legal system.
At its best, the book is sensitive to the evolution of our system
toward the ideal of "due process of law." If you believe that
the present historical period involves significant change from
the past and involves a search for greater legitimacy for social
institutions, then The Politics of Law may stimulate your
thinking to better prepare you for the future.

